第29章

Observe, in the first place, that every one of the arguments by whichthe relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates thepositive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannotknow the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute.

In the very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute is, there lieshidden the assumption that it is; and the making of this assumption provesthat the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing but as asomething. Similarly with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrineis upheld. The Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis to the Phenomenon,is necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is impossible to conceive thatour knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only without at the same timeassuming a Reality of which they are appearances; for appearance withoutreality is unthinkable. Strike out from the argument the terms Unconditioned,Infinite, Absolute, and in place of them write, "negation of conceivability,"or "absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible,"and the argument becomes nonsense. To realize in thought any one of the propositionsof which the argument consists, the Unconditioned must be represented aspositive and not negative. How then can it be a legitimate conclusion fromthe argument, that our consciousness of it is negative? An argument the veryconstruction of which assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but whichends in showing that this term has no such meaning, is simply an elaboratesuicide. Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a definite consciousnessof the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefiniteconsciousness of it.

Perhaps the best way of showing that we are obliged to form a positivethough Vague consciousness of this which transcends distinct consciousness,is to analyze our conception of the antithesis between Relative and Absolute.

It is a doctrine called in question by none, that such antinomies of thoughtas Whole and Part, Equal and Unequal, Singular and Plural, are necessarilyconceived as correlatives: the conception of a part is impossible withoutthe conception of a whole; there can be no idea of equality without one ofinequality. And it is undeniable that in the same manner, the Relative isitself conceivable as such, only by opposition to the Irrelative or Absolute.

Sir William Hamilton, however, in his trenchant (and in most parts unanswerable)criticism on Cousin, contends, in conformity with his position above stated,that one of these correlatives is nothing more than the negation of the other.

"Correlatives,' he says, "certainly suggest each other, but correlativesmay, or may not, be equally real and positive. In thought contradictoriesnecessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of contradictories is one.

But the reality of one contradictory, so far from guaranteeing the realityof the other, is nothing else than its negation. Thus every positive notion(the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion (the conceptof a thing by what it is not); and the highest positive notion, the notionof the conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the notionof the inconceivable. But though these mutually suggest each other, the positivealone is real; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and in thehighest generality, even an abstraction of thought itself." Now theassertion that of such contradictories "the negative is only an abstractionof the other" -- "is nothing else than its negation," -- isnot true. In such correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enoughthat the negative concept contains something besides the negation of thepositive one; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolishedfrom consciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir WilliamHamilton is, that the like holds even with those correlatives of which thenegative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word. Take for examplethe Limited and the Unlimited. Our notion of the Limited is composed, firstlyof a consciousness of some kind of being, and secondly of a consciousnessof the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical notion of theUnlimited, the consciousness of limits is abolished, but not the consciousnessof some kind of being. It is quite true that in the absence of conceivedlimits, this consciousness ceases to be a concept properly so called; butit is none the less true that it remains as a mode of consciousness. If,in such cases, the negative contradictory were, as alleged, "nothingelse" than the negation of the other, and therefore a mere non-entitythen it would follow that negative contradictories could be used interchangeably: the Unlimited might be thought of as antithetical to the Divisible; and theIndivisible as antithetical to the Limited. While the fact that they cannotbe so used, proves that in consciousness the Unlimited and the Indivisibleare qualitatively distinct, and therefore positive or real; since distinctioncannot exist between nothings. The error, (naturally fallen into by philosophersintent on demonstrating the limits and conditions of consciousness,) consistsin assuming that consciousness contains nothing but limits and conditions;to the entire neglect of that which is limited and conditioned. It is forgottenthat there is something which alike forms the raw material of definite thoughtand remains after the definiteness which thinking gave it has been destroyed.